In a democracy every citizen is a moral agent — an independent participant in the moral life of the state.
That core fact constitutes the moral justification of democracy as a practice. Agency within the public sphere affirms the moral standing of every citizen, justifies citizen rights and mutual responsibilities between individual and state, and legitimizes the right of the state to rule, since it governs with the citizen's participation and at the public's behest. The line between citizen and government is thin and porous: the citizen is the state. Moral agency binds them.
This core moral relationship presents a useful yardstick to evaluate many other practices that may nurture or hinder the proper functioning of democracy.
For instance, wider enfranchisement increases the pool of moral agents (thus interests) influencing the state. Since democracy is justified by the moral agency of citizens, limits upon enfranchisement diminish this agency, weakening the integrity of the democratic process. Exclusions must be justified, otherwise the legitimacy of the democratic state is compromised.
Another: a citizen's non-participation in a standing democracy is a moral choice. In fact it tends to be an immoral choice: when chosen it reduces both the moral standing of the agent and the moral bond of responsibility of the state to that citizen. (In the vox-pop US aphorism: if you didn't vote, don't complain.)
Another: since no individual controls the political environment, people must bond with like-minded others to influence policy. Given this necessity for group effort, freedoms of speech and assembly are morally justified. Limits upon these freedoms must be justified before imposition, at the risk of reducing the legitimacy of the state.
In other words, any policy or procedure that affects the ability of the citizen to act as a moral agent is justified or not, depending on its effect upon the agency of the citizen — explicitly because this agency is the central moral justification of a democratic system.
In non-democratic countries, when democracy becomes a demand of the people, those who support democracy must understand the moral value they are insisting upon: that is, equal voices even for their political opponents. Morally the democratic voice must support a non-exclusive regime for balancing the interests of everyone because everyone is the regime.
A failed state is easy to define: the governed no longer consent. Consent of the governed is the state; there is no state without it. But that means all of the governed, or else the system is not democratic — in fact it is corrupt.
A demand for anything less than inclusion of every legitimate agent is not a call for democracy, not a rejection of tyranny or corruption, but rather a plea for a new tyranny and a different set of corruptions — which is bound to fail.
That core fact constitutes the moral justification of democracy as a practice. Agency within the public sphere affirms the moral standing of every citizen, justifies citizen rights and mutual responsibilities between individual and state, and legitimizes the right of the state to rule, since it governs with the citizen's participation and at the public's behest. The line between citizen and government is thin and porous: the citizen is the state. Moral agency binds them.
This core moral relationship presents a useful yardstick to evaluate many other practices that may nurture or hinder the proper functioning of democracy.
For instance, wider enfranchisement increases the pool of moral agents (thus interests) influencing the state. Since democracy is justified by the moral agency of citizens, limits upon enfranchisement diminish this agency, weakening the integrity of the democratic process. Exclusions must be justified, otherwise the legitimacy of the democratic state is compromised.
Another: a citizen's non-participation in a standing democracy is a moral choice. In fact it tends to be an immoral choice: when chosen it reduces both the moral standing of the agent and the moral bond of responsibility of the state to that citizen. (In the vox-pop US aphorism: if you didn't vote, don't complain.)
Another: since no individual controls the political environment, people must bond with like-minded others to influence policy. Given this necessity for group effort, freedoms of speech and assembly are morally justified. Limits upon these freedoms must be justified before imposition, at the risk of reducing the legitimacy of the state.
In other words, any policy or procedure that affects the ability of the citizen to act as a moral agent is justified or not, depending on its effect upon the agency of the citizen — explicitly because this agency is the central moral justification of a democratic system.
In non-democratic countries, when democracy becomes a demand of the people, those who support democracy must understand the moral value they are insisting upon: that is, equal voices even for their political opponents. Morally the democratic voice must support a non-exclusive regime for balancing the interests of everyone because everyone is the regime.
A failed state is easy to define: the governed no longer consent. Consent of the governed is the state; there is no state without it. But that means all of the governed, or else the system is not democratic — in fact it is corrupt.
A demand for anything less than inclusion of every legitimate agent is not a call for democracy, not a rejection of tyranny or corruption, but rather a plea for a new tyranny and a different set of corruptions — which is bound to fail.
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Pro philosophers: Refrain from bleeding until actually shot. Weep at will.
--GC